The systematicity challenge to anti-representational dynamicism by Verdejo, VM
Synthese (2015) 192:701–722
DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0597-9
The systematicity challenge to anti-representational
dynamicism
Víctor M. Verdejo
Received: 24 February 2014 / Accepted: 20 October 2014 / Published online: 17 December 2014
© The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive
sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and rad-
ically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue
that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old
systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an
implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behav-
ioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then consider a case of insect
sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude
that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of system-
atic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral
capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and power-
ful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation,
including the representational level.
Keywords Dynamicism · Behavioral systematicity · Levels of explanation ·
Representation · Systematicity challenge
1 Introduction
New trends in cognitive research capitalize on anti-representational dynamicism,
which these days has taken much of the role once played by connectionism as the
hallmark of heterodoxy. Connectionism is apparently not at the centre of the contro-
versy anymore. This seems to be so in spite of the fact that connectionism arguably
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provided the research context that gave rise to and supported dynamical theory in the
first place.1 Prominent quarters in cognitive science agree that cognition is essentially
accountable in terms of the assumptions and mathematical language of dynamics. As
many authors have pointed out, dynamicism is not necessarily anti-representational.
However, dynamicism, unlike its connectionist and classicist predecessors, “forms a
powerful framework for developing models of cognition that sidestep representation
altogether” (Van Gelder 1998, p. 622). More importantly, the hopes associated with
dynamical approaches to cognition crystallize vividly in a growing consensus that
assumes anti-representationalism as a working hypothesis (e.g., Varela et al. 1991;
Van Gelder 1995; Port and van Gelder 1995; Thompson 2007; Calvo Garzón 2008;
Chemero 2009).
Remarkably, the anti-representational dynamicist turn has led to a number of influ-
ential accounts in several fields such as robotics (Brooks 1991), motor control and
coordination (Haken et al. 1985; Kelso 1995; Beer 1995), developmental psychology
(Thelen and Smith 1994; Thelen et al. 2001), perception categorization (Beer 2003),
imagined action (Van Rooij et al. 2002), to name a few. In this paper, I concentrate
on a particular explanatory target, namely, systematicity. At present, we lack a fully
developed or explicitly articulated dynamicist account of systematicity. However, pro-
ponents of non-representational dynamicism naturally attempt to extend their models
to phenomena of high cognition and hence try to deal with what apparently are “rep-
resentation hungry problems” (Clark and Toribio 1994; Clark 1997, pp. 166–170).
In this context, systematicity is indeed one decisive and central touchstone for the
consideration of a promising and overarching cognitive research program of high cog-
nition. Unsurprisingly, systematicity has been explicitly acknowledged as a genuine
explananda in dynamicist developments (Horgan and Tienson 1994, pp. 328–333;
Petitot 1995; Van Gelder 1998, §6.9; Calvo Garzón 2004). The clear presumption,
therefore, is that dynamicism may offer a rival non-representational explanation of
systematicity and contribute as a third party to the debate carried out by classicist and
connectionist contenders for the last 30 years or so.
As is known, the ‘systematicity debate’ has consisted of a relentless classi-
cist/connectionist debate. Since Fodor and Pylyshyn’s seminal paper (1988), the
dialectics surrounding systematicity may make it seem that we are, as it were, stuck in a
closed loop. On the one hand, supporters of classical schemes of mental representation
have emphasized again and again the need of a compositional system of symbols in the
account of systematicity phenomena (e.g., Fodor and McLaughlin 1990; McLaughlin
1993, 2009; García-Carpintero 1995; Aydede 1997; Fodor 1997; Hadley 2004). On
the other hand, proponents of connectionist sub-symbolic schemes of mental represen-
tation have tried to respond to the different challenges posed by classicists in a variety
of ways (e.g., Van Gelder 1990; Smolensky 1990; Smolensky et al. 1992; Matthews
1994; Cummins 1996; Cummins et al. 2001) (see Aizawa 2003 for detailed discussion).
1 Van Gelder for instance takes connectionism to be “a particular subcategory of the wider class of dynamical
systems” (Van Gelder 1995, p. 370), and Horgan and Tienson assume that the dynamical framework provides
“the natural mathematical characterization of connectionist networks” and take this fact as a way of “further
articulating and supporting the [dynamical] framework” (Horgan and Tienson 1994, p. 305). See also
Dorffner (1999) for a general articulation of the relation between connectionism and dynamicism.
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Whether or not connectionist models support a form of analogue computation, both
classicist and connectionist competitors in the debate are versions of representational
computationalism, that is to say, the view that cognition consists in the manipulation
of representations according to rules. We are indeed familiar with the view that (rad-
ical or extreme) dynamicism parts company with representational computationalism
(e.g. Van Gelder and Port 1995; Eliasmith 1996; Chemero 2009; Fresco 2012). In this
context, the desiderata associated with anti-representational dynamicism, considered
as a general theory of cognition, clearly includes the aim of offering a rival and new
kind of explanation of systematicity. Some authors have even shown sympathy to the
view that dynamicism may not only offer a rival account, but entirely reformulate the
debate out of the representational-computational paradigm so as to resolve or some-
how stop the dialectical loop between classicist and connectionist parties. This seems
to be Calvo Garzón’s standpoint when he writes:
It is noteworthy, however, that both hypotheses, the classical and the connection-
ist, fall neatly within the information-processing paradigm. [...] Perhaps we are
stuck in a never-ending dialectic of positing challenges to connectionism, and
then trying to account for them statistically, forever and ever. [...] In view of this
scenario, I contend, we may need to consider turning to questions concerning
the role that potential contenders, such as Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) [...]
may play in the future. (Calvo Garzón 2004, p. 14)
Calvo Garzón’s clear suggestion in this passage is that anti-representational DST is
called to provide, in the context of discussions about systematicity, a way out of
the “information-processing blind alley”, as he calls it, represented by classicist and
connectionist versions of computationalism.2
It is my view that anti-representational dynamicism will probably not offer a fully
satisfactory account of systematicity of the sort suggested in Calvo Garzón’s quo-
tation. In this paper, I will argue, more precisely, that any explanations of system-
aticity offered on the anti-representational dynamicist model should be ready to meet
a renewed version of the old systematicity challenge. Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1988)
celebrated challenge can be stated thus: either connectionist accounts do not explain
systematicity or, if they do, they are (mere) implementations of (and hence no real
alternative to) accounts in terms of symbolic representation. Without endorsing any
particular position regarding the outcome of this challenge, in this paper I show that
it is revisited in the anti-representational version encouraged by dynamicism: either
2 As several authors have pointed out, computation must not be confused with information processing (Pic-
cinini and Scarantino 2011; Fresco 2013). In addition, it is not clear that anti-representational dynamicism
should stand against a generic computational paradigm, one that includes some form of non-digital (ana-
logue) or non-representational computation. In the context of the present discussion, anti-representational
dynamicism is considered in opposition to the family of theories that embrace a form of representational
computationalism–conceived broadly as including classicist or symbolic and connectionist or sub-symbolic
variants–which involves (semantic) information processing of the sort required by the recourse to represen-
tations. More on the target notion of representation below.
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non-representational dynamicism does not explain systematicity, or else, if it does, it
is just an implementation of representational accounts.3
I do not mean to suggest that the presented line of reasoning is, if sound, conclusive
against the merits of an anti-representationalist stance generally. Anti-representational
approaches may shed light on a variety of aspects of cognition and may also have a
regulative role for the explanatory useful postulation of representations. Furthermore,
the discussion will involve certain obvious limitations: this critical assessment will
be based upon an analysis of just one particular simple case and in relation to the
specific problem of systematicity. Sympathizers of anti-representational dynamicism
may still argue for the irrelevance of the case, the problem, or both. Nonetheless,
the suggestion is that the analysis to follow spells out (1) the nature of the difficul-
ties anti-representational dynamicism must face in the account of systematicity and
(2) the traits of the debate we are forced to face once anti-representational dynam-
icism is under serious consideration as a general alternative model of systematic
cognition.
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section presents the
issue under scrutiny via a neutral characterization of dynamicism, representation
and systematicity. This clarification task is especially demanding in the case of
the notion of systematicity because an explicit non-representational characteriza-
tion of this notion is lacking in the literature. In Sect. 3, I will analyze a par-
ticular case of systematic sensorimotor behavior not suspicious of involving ten-
dentious computational or representational assumptions: systematic behavior in the
honey bee. I will also carefully examine in which sense dynamicist approaches
may provide an explanation of such behavior and conclude that anti-representational
dynamicist accounts fail to explain the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors
qua systematic, i.e., their involving the exercise of the same behavioral capaci-
ties. As a conclusion (Sect. 4), I will suggest a distinctive way out of the pose-
challenge/respond-to-challenge dialectics: to look for a unified, though rich and com-
plex, cognitive science where different levels of explanation–including notably the
representational level–result in powerful accounts of cognitive phenomena, such as
systematicity.
3 Though we lack a ready-made statement of the implementation relation, in this paper I follow standard
practice in the literature (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Fodor and McLaughlin 1990; Marcus 2001;
McLaughlin 2009) in considering implementation as (a) a relation between (categories or processes at)
higher levels and (categories or processes at) lower levels of explanation (b) which is asymmetrical (if
A implements B, then B does not implement A), one-many (A1, A2, . . .An may be different candidate
implementations for B), and transitive (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, p. 68) (if A implements B and B imple-
ments C, then A implements C). In the specific context of this paper, the target high level in question is the
representational level, broadly conceived. Anti-representational dynamicism would offer implementations
of (classicist or connectionist) representational accounts in dynamical systems of differential equations
located at a level or levels below the representational level. That classicist and connectionist representa-
tional theories may be implemented in non-representational systems is something explicitly acknowledged
already in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s seminal paper (1988, p. 10, emphasis theirs):
[…] just as it is possible to implement a Connectionist cognitive architecture in a network of causally
interacting nonrepresentational [e.g., neurological, or molecular, or quantum mechanical] elements,
so too it is perfectly possible to implement a Classical cognitive architecture in such a network.
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2 Dynamicism, representation and systematicity. The issue neutrally described
This is the question that concerns us here: can dynamicism account for systematicity
phenomena without recourse to representations? A proper statement of the question
requires an explanation of the meaning of the terms involved.
2.1 Dynamicism
It is hard to downplay the rising importance of dynamicism or dynamical systems
theory or the dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science over the last years. Since
scholars are familiar with the fundamental traits of this school, a brief characterization
will suffice for present purposes.
Dynamicism is the general view that cognitive behavior can be accounted for in
terms of the mathematical models of dynamics. More precisely, the dynamicist the-
sis claims that cognitive behavior is to be explained in terms of sets of (nonlinear)
differential equations that provide the values of a number n of variables as chang-
ing over time and which define an n-dimensional state space or dynamic field.4 In
a sense, this thesis is a truism: since, by general assent, cognitive behavior is phys-
ically implemented, it must be accountable in terms of the dynamical language of
physics. The truism disappears when it is claimed that cognition can and should be
modeled in such terms across the board. Thus, dynamicism turns on a commitment
to explanations of cognitive phenomena essentially involving (numerical) quantifi-
cation of variables, a metric of time, analysis of the interdependence between vari-
ables, and focus on differential equations of change of those variables over time.
In the literature, there are several features that can be emphasized or added to the
picture: stability or self-organization (of behavior under certain conditions) (e.g.,
Kelso 1995), real time modeling (as opposed to ‘ersatz’ time modeling) (e.g., Van
Gelder and Port 1995), continuity in state-space evolution (e.g., Calvo Garzón 2008),
agent-environment coupling (e.g., Beer 1995; Chiel and Beer 1997) or quantitative
character (of the variables and behavior in the system) (e.g., Van Gelder 1998). Care-
ful delineation of all these related aspects goes clearly beyond the purposes of our
discussion.
Crucially, some theorists take it that dynamicism amounts to or else strongly encour-
ages anti-representationalism, that is, the thesis that cognition is not representational
computation. The question of whether dynamicism really entails or otherwise natu-
rally demands anti-representationalism is contentious. As is known, even paradigmatic
cases of dynamical models can be taken to involve representations in fundamental ways
(Bechtel 1998; Grush 2003). Assessment of such deep questions concerning dynam-
icism is beyond the reasonable scope of this paper. Here, I will explore the nature of
dynamicist explanations of systematicity only insofar as they are within the scope of
anti-representational dynamicism (see also Sect. 1 and fn. 2).
4 Van Gelder (1995) famously illustrated dynamical systems via the Watt centrifugal governor for control-
ling the speed of steam engines. In general, the best examples of dynamical modeling are what in control
theory are known as closed-loop control systems (see Grush 2003 for detailed discussion).
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2.2 Representation
Although more ambitious statements are available, by representation I understand
a state, set of states or process (hence, something out there in the world, plausibly
in somebody’s head) which stands in for or carries information about other states
or events. That which the state or process stands in for or carries information about
counts as the content of the representation. Representations, so understood, involve
(a) a possible range of contents associated with them; (b) these contents being asso-
ciated in a determined way (in accordance with a certain representational scheme);
and (c) with conditions on proper functioning or manipulation and correct repre-
sentation. Thus, I follow many authors (e.g., Clark and Toribio 1994; Clark 1997;
Van Gelder 1995; Bechtel 1998; Grush 2003; Chemero 2009) in taking a version
of Haugeland’s tripartite characterization (cf. Haugeland 1991, p. 62) as a base-
line notion of representation. Although such a notion of representation involves a
commitment to (information-processing) computationalism, this capsule-form def-
inition has the merit of being quite neutral as regards the many different ways in
which the notion of representation might be ultimately understood. For instance, it
remains neutral as to whether representational contents are internal or external to the
computing system, whether representation is primarily language-like or analogue,
or whether representation should be characterized in terms of strong decoupabil-
ity (of the potentially absent target represented and the representing state) or else
in terms of a weak (feedback-dependant) decoupability (as in emulation theory).
For present purposes, we can postpone a statement of the precise nature of repre-
sentation by appealing to the propounded baseline and all-embracing conception of
representation.
Generally, and in the particular case of systematicity, I assume that the legitimate
postulation of representations requires the specification of a real explanatory task
not achievable by alternative theoretical means. Even though one can find a priori
arguments in favor of the classical representations in cognitive science (e.g., Davies
1991), I also assume that whether we are right in considering a state, set of states or
process of an organism as fulfilling such a task is, ultimately, an empirical question.
There seems to be a large consensus on these points among classicists and dynamicists
alike (e.g., Burge 2010; Van Gelder 1995, p. 352; Bechtel 1998; Beer 2014).
2.3 Systematicity
Our discussion must rely on a neutral notion of systematicity. More precisely, the issue
at stake requires that we describe systematicity without appealing, either explicitly or
implicitly, to the notion of representation. This turns out to be not a very easy task. The
reason is that representation-free characterizations of systematicity are, if not utterly
absent, quite unusual in the literature: the paradigm cases of systematicity phenomena
are linguistic or conceptual cases, that is to say, cases that very obviously fit the repre-
sentational scheme (see e.g., Fodor 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; McLaughlin 1993,
2009). Some authors would even suggest that systematicity should be stated in terms
of “abilities to have mental representations with propositional contents” (McLaughlin
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2009, p. 254). However, a purely behavioral characterization of systematicity is very
much needed for a neutral assessment of the systematicity issue generally (see e.g.,
García-Carpintero 1995; Verdejo 2012). A purely behavioral characterization prevents
prejudice in the assessment of rival explanations at the representational level and is
patently required when engaged in the project of assessing anti-representational the-
ories. What I propose for present purposes is, therefore, to characterize systematicity
in terms of causally and nomologically related behaviors.
By nomologically and causally related behaviors (or nomologically related behav-
iors for short) I understand cognitive behaviors for which conditionals of a certain
form are true in virtue of/ justified by appeal to causal laws, or laws involving causal
relations. By ‘law’ in this context I refer simply to ceteris paribus empirical gen-
eralizations or regularities which are counterfactual supporting (cf. Aizawa 2003,
pp. 28–29; McLaughlin 2009, pp. 252–253). For present purposes, we do not need
to specify the nature of the causal relation that the law involves. Suffice it to say that
the causal relation in question would prevent the law to consist of a merely accidental
regularity or generalization. The form of the conditionals is as follows: if behavior
(of type) A occurs, then behavior (of type) B (at least potentially) also occurs. The
conditionals do not express a purely causal relation between behaviors A and B. They
express a law or generalization, or an instance of a law or generalization, that connects
A and B and which involves a causal relation. Thus, the causal relation need not, and
typically should not be read off the conditional itself. The conditionals do not say, and
in the cases to be considered it is generally not the case, that A behaviors cause or
bring about B behaviors.
Thus, the propounded basic characterization is this: given two nomologically and
causally related cognitive behaviors, A and B, they are systematically related behav-
iors insofar as they are exercises of the same cognitive behavioral capacity or set of
behavioral capacities. The relevant truism of this characterization is that any pair of
behaviors whatsoever, A and B, might be nomologically related behaviors without
their being systematically related. Let us state this more precisely. The character-
ization assumes that every pair of cognitive behaviors, A and B, are, respectively,
the behavioral result of a set of cognitive behavioral capacities A(ca1 , ca2 , . . . , can ) and
B(cb1, cb2, . . . , cbn). Provided that there is a causal law that connects A and B, to render
A and B systematic requires, in addition, that at least one of the capacities involved
in the production of A is the same as one of the capacities involved in the production
of B—i.e., ∃cai cbu(cai = cbu).5
Some examples will help to elucidate this notion of systematicity. Thus, a subject S’s
riding a bicycle (behavior A), causally entails S’s (potential) perceptual identification
of bicycles (behavior B). However, the capacities responsible for A (having to do
with limb movement, motor-coordination or equilibrium) are in this case completely
distinct from the capacities responsible for B (such as memory retrieval or recognition
5 The approach must therefore make room for a notion of complex behavior (i.e., behavior that arises out of
more than one behavioral capacity) but note that this is not to enter into a discussion about compositionality.
In the systematicity debate, compositionality is a property of (structured) representations. For present
concerns, granted that we do not wish to beg the question against the anti-representationalist, and even if a
connection can be pursued regarding the proposed approach, compositionality issues must be put aside.
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of bicycle-defining perceptual traits). Similarly, S’s eating a burger (behavior A) is
nomologically and causally related to, as it might be, S’s digesting it (behavior B).
These behaviors would however fail to be systematic because none of the behavioral
capacities for A (such as capacities for biting, chewing or swallowing) are the same as
the capacities intervening in the production of B (such as the ones involved in nutrients
decomposition, chemical alteration and absorption).
Now, a paradigmatic case of systematic behavior is the following: to utter the sen-
tence ‘John loves Mary’ and to utter the sentence ‘Mary loves John’. These behaviors
are nomologically related ones: in actual language-users, if one exhibits one of them,
then one must (at least potentially) exhibit the other. Following our proposed charac-
terization, this pair of behaviors is, in addition to its being nomologically related, also
a systematic pair: the behaviors at stake correspond to the same behavioral capacities,
namely, the capacities to utter the words ‘Mary’, ‘John’, and ‘loves’.
The distinction between merely causally and nomologically related behaviors and
systematically related ones is crucial for a correct assessment of the systematicity
debate. The distinction reflects the ‘intrinsic-connection’ requirement for systematic-
ity appealed to by Fodor and allies (e.g., Fodor 1987, p. 149; Fodor and Pylyshyn
1988, p. 37) where, to put it in Aizawa’s terms, “the claim regarding intrinsic connec-
tions concerns cognitive capacities or competences” (2003, p. 92). In a similar vein,
McLaughlin analyzes systematicity as involving a “constitutive basis” for the posses-
sion of capacities (McLaughlin 1993, §2). In the context of our discussion, we can
gloss the use of these expressions as expressing the fundamental point that in order for
a pair of behaviors to be systematic it is not enough that their presence or occurrence is
regularly and causally connected in nature. In addition, there must be a common expla-
nation of this fact. In the terms I am proposing, the explanation concerns the existence
of common behavioral capacities involved in the production of the target behaviors.
We may state the foregoing points in terms of Behavioral Systematicity (BS):
(BS)
A given pair of behaviors A and B is systematic to the extent that:
(a) A and B are causally and nomologically related behaviors (they comply with
causal laws of the conditional form: if A, then (potentially) B).
(b) A and B are exercises of at least one common behavioral capacity.
(c) The fact that (b) is (part of) an explanation of the fact that (a).6
BS invokes only behaviors and behavioral capacities and is, therefore, a representation-
free notion of systematicity of the sort we need in order to be neutral with respect to
anti-representationalist views. Clearly, what is crucial for BS is the correct, empirically
contrasted, identification of behavioral capacities as manifested in overt or observable
(types of) behavior. Several counterfactuals may be used to establish the existence of
such capacities for any pair of systematic behaviors A and B. The counterfactuals
would show that one does not find organisms that exhibit A without exhibiting B, or
that if an organism ceases to exhibit A, then it ceases to exhibit B. These would be
6 The term ‘explanation’ should be read in ontological terms as meaning ‘true explanation’. It goes without
saying that one such explanation must offer a way of properly discriminating behavioral capacities. More
on this below.
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empirically contrasted counterfactuals to the effect that A and B constitute kinds of
cognitive behaviors that, as Fodor and Pylyshyn put it, come “in structurally related
clusters” (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, p. 49). One may of course deny, or otherwise
exhibit extreme skepticism towards the existence or the widespread existence of sys-
tematicity phenomena (e.g., Johnson 2004; Gomila et al. 2012). The ongoing dialec-
tics, however, requires that one accepts some neutral characterization of systematicity
to advance the present discussion.
Several caveats may prevent much misunderstanding in the discussion to follow. In
the first place, the presented notion of systematicity is not to be considered as involving
a definition with necessary and sufficient conditions. I side here with McLaughlin in
thinking that “no statement of such [noncircular necessary and sufficient] conditions,
no definition [of systematicity], is to be had” (McLaughlin 2009, p. 252). In the context
of our discussion, it is enough that we have a sufficiently clear, coherent and handy
notion of behavioral systematicity applicable to central cases.
Admittedly however, the target notion may be put to the test by a number of lim-
iting cases in which the individuation of behaviors and behavioral capacities is not
deemed appropriate. For instance, my catching this baseball at 75 km/h (behavior
A), is certainly an exercise of the same behavioral capacity as catching this baseball
at 75.5 km/h (behavior B). I doubt however that one is really tempted to judge that
these behaviors are, in any cognitively relevant sense, systematically related (instead
of considering them as the same kind of behavior simpliciter). We may refer to these
cases as trivially systematic: BS is fulfilled for A and B but only because A=B. Since
we do not want the number of systematic behaviors under consideration to increase
absurdly, a minimally interesting reading of the notion requires excluding cases of
trivial systematicity. Similarly, note that condition (c) rules out cases of what we can
call idle systematicity, that is, cases in which (a) and (b) in BS are fulfilled for A and
B but only because the capacity considered to be involved is a catch-all, explanato-
rily irrelevant capacity. For example, eating, climbing, flying or running might all be
viewed as exercises of some general capacity of survival or as involving the capac-
ity of breathing. But these behaviors are systematically related only in an idle and
explanatorily irrelevant sense in relation to such capacities.
Relatedly, inappropriate reading of the target characterization seems to rule out
paradigmatic instances of systematicity. Mentally performing a piece of mathematical
or logical reasoning is certainly a case in point. There is no obvious sense in which
we should consider the steps in the mental calculus as different sorts of behaviors–
indeed, it is not obvious why we should consider them as overt behaviors at all–
in which case the propounded characterization may be called into question. Such
cases are characterized by the absence of specific observable behaviors associated
with them. Sufficiently complex analysis, however, might construe cases of logical
or mathematical reasoning as involving relevant sorts of (intelligent) overt behavior
such as successfully performing calculations or providing correct answers to logical
problems. The details of such a story may be hard to fill. The presumption, however,
is that such a story would provide candidate behaviors that would render abstract
reasoning and similar processes of high-level cognition systematic in our sense.
Finally, there are two further conditions that the relevant behaviors must reasonably
meet. First, the nomological relation of behaviors that are candidates for systematic-
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ity must plausibly be symmetric, that is, the conditionals of the form ‘if behavior A,
then (potentially) behavior B’ must be reversible to ‘if behavior B, then (potentially)
behavior A’. If the nomological relation is not reversible in this way, this would be
quite strong evidence that there is no common behavioral capacity involved in their
production. Secondly, the kind of behaviors at stake must not be purely reactive behav-
iors. The amoeba moving around in water may be taken to satisfy some instances of
BS. Granted that the behavior of the amoeba is indeed purely reactive or automatic or
involves purely reactive capacities, this is an undesired result. This result is avoided if
we restrict our characterization to bona fide, non-purely reactive cognitive behaviors.
3 Systematic behavior in the honey bee
In a completely different context, Carruthers (2004) has argued that honey bee behav-
ior involves a bee’s mind in the quite demanding sense of a belief/desire psychology.
Nothing of the sort will be defended here. However, bee behavior is a case of system-
aticity especially salient in this context. To put it mildly, bee behavior is a significant
kind of sensorimotor, embedded, embodied and completely practical behavior. Bluntly
put, bee behavior is not a chess game or some other sort of logical or abstract cognitive
phenomenon apt for easy computational or representational interpretation. My focus
on such a case involves a clear suggestion: if anti-representational dynamicism cannot
explain all there is, from a purely behavioral standpoint, to bee systematic behavior, that
must be because systematic behavior generally does not fit the anti-representational
dynamicist mould. Here is the broad outline of the argument that follows:
(1) Systematic behaviors are exercises of the same behavioral capacities (as per BS).
(2) Anti-representational dynamicism offers (eventually very complex) specifications
of behavior in dynamic fields, but no account of the underlying behavioral capac-
ities of such specifications, and hence no account of systematicity.
(3) Representational theories do offer an account of behavioral capacities underlying
systematic behavior in terms of representational schemes.
Conclusion: Anti-representational dynamicism cannot adequately explain system-
aticity if it is not by dynamically implementing a representational account.
To establish (2), it will be useful to investigate the explanatory import of dynamical
accounts regarding (merely) nomological behaviors (Subsect. 3.1) and behaviors that
are furthermore systematic (Subsect. 3.2). This (abductive) argument will be com-
pleted in Subsect. 3.3 with a defense of (3) via an analysis of the representational
alternative.
3.1 Merely nomologically related behavior: honey bees flying behavior
It is common wisdom that honey bees–Apis mellifera–spend their lives foraging nectar
and pollen for the hive’s colony. They look for a source of nectar and then go back to
the nest over and over again from birth until death. Detailed observation has shown
that honey bee spatial behavior is richer than in many other insects, involving a vari-
ety of flight strategies such as straight flight trajectories, landmark exploitation and
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short cutting. For present purposes, we can select the following extremely simplified
conditional regarding bee cognitive behavior: if a honey bee is capable of flying from
the hive to sources of nectar, then, as a matter of empirical and contingent truth, it is
also capable of flying back from the sources of nectar to the hive. We have then the
following pair of nomologically related flying behaviors:
FB1: flying from the hive to sources of nectar.
FB2: flying from sources of nectar to the hive.
Scholars have postulated quite complex kinds of representations in order to account
for bee flying and navigating behavior. They include both egocentric view-based dead
reckoning and allocentric and general map-like spatial representation (see e.g., Men-
zel et al. 2006). But our aim is to consider whether an account in terms of anti-
representational dynamicism could be given that can dispense with representations
altogether and, still, be a satisfactory account of bees flying behavior. On the assump-
tion that FB1 and FB2 are not systematic, but merely nomologically and causally
connected cognitive behaviors,7 there is no obvious reason why we should doubt that
such an explanation is possible.
Let us illustrate this point with a toy example. Consider a dynamical function where
FB1 and FB2 target behaviors are accounted for in terms of the bee’s flying position as
continuously changing over time with respect to the hive’s position. Let us introduce,
then, the position of the bee in the hive’s range (xb) and the position of the hive (x0).
Bee flying behavior can be seen as responding to distance with respect to the hive
(xb − x0). When a maximum distance in a foraging flight has been reached (and a
quantity goal of nectar achieved), bee dynamics make it return back home. That is,
the effect of distance would be a continuously increasing negative force towards the
hive’s position. Once at hive, however, a certain ‘foraging inertia’ produces another
foraging flight, which again, would be associated with a continuously increasing back-
to-hive flying response. Thus, to a very rough approximation, bee flying behavior (FB1,
FB2) can be accounted for in terms of the following second order linear differential
equation:
mb(d2xb/dt2) = −kb(xb − x0),
where mb is interpreted as a bee foraging constant, d2xb/dt2 stands for the continuously
changing bee foraging impetus, and kb is a homing constant. To be sure, this serves
at most as a rough and even metaphorical approximation to a dynamical account of
bee flying behavior, but it is enough to illustrate how easily we can begin to provide
a dynamical account of such behavior. Indeed, so interpreted, bee flying behavior can
be assimilated to the behavior of a simple harmonic oscillator–such as a spring or a
pendulum–where mb is the inertial mass, d2xb/dt2 is the acceleration and kb is the
7 The point of the assumption about the non-systematic character of the target behaviors is both illustrative
and concessive, regarding the kinds of accounts that anti-representational dynamicism may be taken to
provide. In addition, there seems to be prima facie nothing really puzzling about the idea that the capacities
involved in the production of FB1 (c f b11 , c
f b1
2 , . . . , c
f b1
n ) and FB2 (c f b21 , c
f b2
2 , . . . , c
f b2
n ) are such that
¬∃c f b1i c f b2u (c f b1i = c f b2u ). It is only needed that the capacities involved in feeding-flights are distinct
from the capacities involved in returning flights.
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Fig. 1 Bee flying behavior can be initially modeled as an undamped pendulum or some other form of
simple harmonic motion. Foraging displacements (black arrows) are associated to a restoring force towards
equilibrium position x0 (the hive) which produces homing displacements (grey arrows) at the maximum
distance. Once bees arrive at hive, a certain foraging inertia make them go past equilibrium to complete the
cycle
stiffness constant: a paradigmatic instance of behavior accountable in dynamical terms
(see Fig. 1).8
As wished, the dynamics here are completely free from representational posits and
offer an account of why FB1 behavior is connected in nature to FB2 behavior: the
bee flies in an oscillatory fashion in such a way that it seeks for nectar when it flies
from the hive until it reaches a maximum distance (FB1) and, granted the restoring
force associated with the maximum distance, it goes back to the hive to unload its
charge (FB2). The bee repeats this operation because of a certain ‘foraging inertia’
that makes it go past the hive’s equilibrium position and repeats the operation back
and forth through the hive. In short, with sufficient aid of mathematical sophistication,
there is no obvious reason for doubting that a satisfactory account could be given of
the nomological relation between FB1 and FB2 in non-representational dynamics.
3.2 Systematic behavior: honey bees communicating behavior
As is known, honey bees do something more than just flying around foraging nectar
for the hive’s colony. They also possess a unique and considerably rich system of
communication to report to other bees the presence and position of nectar, pollen or
water relative to the position of the hive and the position of the sun in the sky. They
dance in a ‘drawing eight’ pattern in the hive so as to signal with straight movements
crossing the center of the ‘eight figure’ the direction of the source of nectar (determined
by the angle described with respect to the sun) and the distance (determined by the
number of waggles performed) (Gould and Gould 1988). For present purposes, let
8 The suggested model is a toy example but not a mere speculation as a model in cognitive research.
Oscillators have been the benchmark for dynamical accounts of limb movement and coordination at least
since Haken et al. (1985).
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us concentrate on the following simplified conditional regarding bees communicating
behavior. If honey bees are capable of communicating, via an appropriately performed
waggle dance, the position of nectar at 500 m north of the hive, then they are, as a matter
of empirical and contingent truth, also capable of communicating, via an appropriately
performed waggle dance, the position of nectar at 500 m south of the hive. The relevant
pair of nomologically connected communicating behaviors is then CB1 and CB2:
CB1: perform waggle dance so as to signal nectar 500 m north of hive.
CB2: perform waggle dance so as to signal nectar 500 m south of hive.
This is, as required, a completely neutral description of bees communicating behavior.
Now, can this communicating behavior be explained in non-representational dynam-
ical terms?
Let us have a look at a possible strategy. Thelen and colleagues first suggested
(Thelen and Smith 1994) and then carefully articulated (Thelen et al. 2001) a
dynamical account of a classic case of infant perseverative reaching behavior, the
so-called ‘A-not-B error’ originally reported by Piaget (1954). Infants between 7
and 12 months of age exhibit reaching-object behavior as if objects presented to
them and then hid had lasting existence where they first appeared (location A),
even if they observe how the object is switched to another hiding location (loca-
tion B). In broadest outline, Thelen et al. model the infant’s reaching behavior as
a “coupled dynamics of looking, planning, reaching and remembering within the
particular context of the task” (Thelen et al. 2001, p. 5). Thus, reaching A and
reaching B behaviors are the result of the dynamic activation of a motor plan-
ning field, which changes over time and is itself the result of the integration of
the activation of visual and memory parameters (namely, the task input concern-
ing the target locations in the experimental setting, the specific input relative to the
effect of a cued location and the memory input regarding previous reaching deci-
sions) together with a developmentally constrained cooperativity parameter. When
the dynamics yield activation in the motor field above threshold, the reaching move-
ment thereby specified gets generated by the infant (see Thelen et al. 2001 for
details).
Now, Thelen et al.’s (2001) non-representational model works very well in dynam-
ically accounting for the different aspects that affect child development (includ-
ing notably child’s memory) and that determine the ‘A-not-B’ error. This and
similar models that account for the dynamics of motor planning (e.g., Erlhagen
and Schöner 2002; Schöner et al. 1997) may therefore constitute a substantial
anti-representational basis for the explanation of honeybees communicating behav-
ior.
Consider the following sketch of a model by way of illustration. Analogously to the
way in which Thelen et al. model the infant’s (reaching A, and reaching B) behavior,
communicating bees behavior can be modeled in terms of a motor planning field–in
this case a communicating planning field–which shows the activation of a continuous
communicating parameter, x, over time. Different levels of activation of the communi-
cating parameter, u(x), would correspond to different specifications of communicating
behavior. If the level of activation corresponding to a specification of communicating
behavior is above threshold, then the bee would actually perform the corresponding
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Fig. 2 The dynamic field for bee communicating behavior could be seen as a parameter, x, whose activation,
u(x), specifies a range of different behaviors (CB1, CB2,…, CBn) and changes continuously over time. At
t′, the level of activation for CB1 is above threshold and the bee would actually perform the corresponding
waggle dance. These dynamics can be understood as a function of a variety of input parameters, such as,
say, the one corresponding to the quality of nectar detected: if the quality of nectar is higher at a given
location, the activation of communicating parameter for that location would also be higher
waggle dance. The target communicating behaviors are CB1 and CB2 above, but the
model could be extended to any communicating behavior CBn. The dynamic field
may thus be a function of the communicating parameter and time, u(x, t). The system,
in addition, can be taken to be a function of a great deal of different input parame-
ters (such as the ones corresponding to sources of nectar detected, quantity/quality
of nectar, distance, moment of the day, etc.). These input parameters would be the
counterpart of Thelen et al.’s task input, specific input and memory input. Now, if
the input parameters and the evolution of the system in time are appropriate, a given
level of activation of the communicating parameter would be above the perform-
ing threshold and the bee would actually perform the corresponding waggle dance
(see Fig. 2).
Arguably, if fully laid out, one such account would be promising for the explanation
of the nomological connection of communicating behaviors CB1 and CB2. However,
CB1 and CB2 are not only nomologically related from a strictly behavioral point of
view. In addition, bee communicating behavior is, to all intents and purposes, a clear
instance of systematic behavior.
To repeat, systematic behaviors are (causally and nomologically) connected behav-
iors which are, as a matter of empirically testable fact, explained as involving exercises
of the same behavioral capacities (see BS in Sect. 2). CB1 and CB2 are a case in point.
CB1 clearly differs from CB2: it is not the same, from a behavioral point of view to
signal nectar 500 m north of the hive than signaling nectar 500 m south of the hive.
However, and this is the crucial point, no one would reasonably deny that CB1 and
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CB2 are exercises of the same behavioral capacities, namely, the capacities involved
in signaling nectar found in foraging tasks somewhere in the hive’s range.9
The non-representational dynamicist account seems meager as an account of sys-
tematicity in this behavioral sense. Even if we could formulate a mathematical model
with the assumptions and language of dynamic systems in this case, and even if all the
variables and complexity of real bee behavior were taken into account in this mathe-
matical model, the nontrivial question would still arise as of why bee communicating
behavior CB1 is at all systematically linked with bee communicating behavior CB2,
that is, why CB1 and CB2 involve exercises of the same behavioral capacities. In the
appropriate system of differential equations, CB1 would be just a part (e.g., a particular
point, a set of points, a basin of attraction, an arrangement of basins of attraction) of
the continuous dynamic field, whereas CB2 would be just another part of the dynamic
field. It would remain mysterious why CB1 and CB2 are exercises of the same bee
communicating capacities. The systematicity question is thus how one can tell apart,
just by analyzing the differential equations or parameters of a given dynamics, which
behaviors are nomologically related and which are furthermore systematic. No easy
answer to this question seems to be available because any behavior (independently of
whether it is systematic or not) would be, from a dynamical perspective, just a part of
the dynamic field. If this is correct, anti-representational dynamicism is, as a matter
of principle, unable to properly identify, let alone explain, systematicity phenomena.
Anti-representationalists may wish to reply to the foregoing considerations in a
number of ways. First, they may straightforwardly object, that, in dynamical models,
CB1 and CB2 can be considered as exercises of the same behavioral capacity insofar
as they are specified by the same set of nonlinear differential equations.
This suggestion, however, clearly underestimates the problem under consideration,
namely, the problem of properly distinguishing nomologically and causally connected
behaviors from systematic ones. Let us assume that we have a correct dynamical
account for actual CB1 and CB2 in terms of differential equations. Now, let us imag-
ine a counterfactual situation in which CB1 and CB2 are not exercises of the same
behavioral capacity (say, that CB1 is the exercise of a signaling-north communicating
capacity and that CB2 is the exercise of a signaling-south communicating capacity).
The question is: would the difference between actual (systematic) and counterfactual
(non-systematic) scenarios involve a difference in the corresponding dynamic systems
of differential equations? Well, it is hard to see how given that the target behaviors (as
opposed to the underlying capacities) would still be the same and, hence, the dynamic
activation values specifying the (occurrence of the) behaviors must also be the same
in the actual and counterfactual cases. And what else can a set of differential equa-
tions provide apart from a dynamic activation field which specifies (the occurrence of)
the target behaviors? Since the same specifications of bee behavior may correspond
9 Unlike perhaps the case of flying behavior (for which one may conceive FB1 and FB2 as arising out
of different capacities), it seems very hard to deny that one the same kind of communicating behavioral
capacities are involved in FB1 and FB2 and therefore that these are not punctate kinds of behavior. These
communicating capacities might be of a very complex cognitive sort such as the capacity to identify the
position of the sun in the sky and the angle with respect to the target source or the capacity to respond
selectively to distances, quantity and quality of the target.
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to different underlying capacities, these specifications are clearly insensitive to the
capacities underlying such behavior. Therefore, “same set of differential equations”
is not plausibly interpreted as “same underlying behavioral capacities”.
The anti-representational dynamicist may also try to reply that discrimination
between behaviors that are exercises of the same capacities and behaviors that are
not can be made, in dynamical approaches, via empirical data somehow captured or
predicted in the models. Relevant developmental and counterfactual data about a given
pair of nomologically connected behaviors would provide evidence about whether the
pair involves the same or distinct behavioral capacities. What the dynamicist does is
to provide a dynamical account of those empirically confirmed systematicities.
This reply would just be a plain acknowledgement of the main thesis here defended,
namely, that anti-representational dynamicism cannot, in and of itself, discriminate
and let alone provide a satisfactory account of systematic behaviors. The dynamicist
needs to appeal to other sorts of considerations, beyond dynamical approaches as such,
in order to offer principled criteria for distinguishing merely nomologically connected
behaviors and behaviors that are, in addition, systematic. Once the discrimination is
made via alternative means, the dynamicist has nothing on offer that would explain or
ground such discrimination.
The problem is not compellingly addressed by appealing to future improvements
in dynamical accounts and concepts. Forthcoming dynamical analyses, one would be
tempted to argue, might identify in state space or dynamic field which points, sets of
points, attractors or bifurcations would correspond to a given behavioral capacity so as
to identify in turn combinatorial structures involved in properly systematic behaviors.
This strategy is, to my knowledge, quite speculative, but it probably illustrates the
polemical situation once we have arrived at this point. A new systematicity loop
would seem to begin. Granted that we have a dynamic system with a definite dynamic
field, it is hard to see what could ground the required identification of systematic
behaviors—viz. the required selection of points or sets of points or basins of attraction
in the dynamic field–apart from sheer stipulation. The dynamicist contender would
try to provide improved and extremely complex mathematical criteria to address this
worry. Still, the decision as to what parts of the dynamic field correspond to systematic
behaviors would arguably be based upon considerations other than purely dynamic
considerations. The suggestion is that what would do the job in satisfactory dynamicist
explanations of systematicity is not the dynamics of the system per se, but our best
available theory about the target behavioral capacities. Which one is such a theory?
No matter which one you choose exactly, it is to all appearances a representational
theory of cognition.
Another possible way of approaching the problem at stake is in terms of the
distinction between covering-law and mechanistic explanations. It is often claimed
that dynamical models distinctively provide covering-law explanations, that is to say,
explanations that proceed via subsumption of a target phenomenon under a natural
law from which it can be predicted when relevant conditions are stated (Bechtel 1998;
Walmsley 2008; Chemero 2009). The problem with anti-representational dynami-
cism regarding systematicity can be seen as a consequence of the fact that no causal
processes or mechanisms would seem to be specified in the account. Covering-law
explanations for any pair of behaviors A and B are clearly silent regarding underly-
123
Synthese (2015) 192:701–722 717
ing behavioral capacities and, therefore, seem compatible with these behaviors being
either systematic or unsystematic. This is so over and above the predictive power of the
alleged dynamical model. But the point against dynamical accounts of systematicity
is not merely, as it might be, that dynamical explanations are not mechanistic and are,
for this reason, at fault (cf. Eliasmith 1996). The point is more exactly that, insofar
as they are not mechanistic, no criterion appears to be in view for the discrimination
between merely nomologically connected and genuinely systematic behaviors.
True, some authors would be ready to argue that dynamical explanations are also
mechanistic or causal (e.g., Gervais and Weber 2011; Zednik 2011). But conceding this
point does not lead the anti-representational dynamicist too far. For the problem would
then simply turn to whether the dynamicist could really invoke non-representational
mechanisms and causes in this context. Indeed, it is hard to see that the alleged mecha-
nisms or causal agents, if any, figuring in would-be satisfactory dynamical explanations
of systematicity are other than, precisely, the corresponding mechanisms and causal
agents postulated in schemes of representational explanation. This point is in agree-
ment, for instance, with Carlos Zednik’s observation that advocates of mechanistic
explanations in dynamical approaches “may be steering toward reconciliation with
proponents of representationalism” (Zednik 2011, p. 261, emphasis his). Thus, the
dilemma between covering-law and mechanistic-causal explanation in dynamicism as
regards systematicity is plausibly seen as just a version of the dilemma between either
failing to explain or else implementing representational explanations of systematicity
phenomena. Let us examine, therefore, the latter kind of explanation.
3.3 The representational solution
Compare the above scenario with the following: let us postulate a representational sys-
tem or scheme for the honey bee, say, a system that involves representation of nectar
position relative to the hive. For present purposes, we can state the representational
scheme as a function R that takes direction, d, distance with respect to the hive, dis,
and target, t , as inputs and delivers the corresponding waggle dance as output. Let
us assume that the function R(d, dis, t) determines a possible range of contents (of
the form ‘Target t , at direction d and distance dis’) expressible in a waggle dance.
Let us assume further that this function is subject to malfunctioning and misrepre-
sentation. Since the psychological reality of R would ultimately require its physical
implementation in bee organisms, it follows that R would involve the sorts of states,
sets of states and processes meeting our previous characterization of representation
(see Sect. 2 above).
Although described in roughest outline, this representational scheme constitutes
what we can call a nectar-location representational system for the honey bee. With
some such representational system in hand, we begin to see what would explain the
fact that CB1 and CB2 are exercises of the same behavioral capacity: if a system such
as R is used by the bee then we can consider it as being the basis of the different
manifestations of bee communicating behavior. Thus, if bees exploit R in order to
signal ‘t =NECTAR, at d1 =NORTH and dis=500 m’, then it is only to be expected
that they exploit the same representational scheme in order to signal ‘t =NECTAR at
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d2 =SOUTH and dis=500 m’. The exercise of one and the same behavioral capacity
is seen, under this view, as the use of one and the same representational scheme R.
Filling in the details of the representational story involves all sorts of complex and
substantial matters. The correct statement of a representational system must include
fundamental claims about the exact content and structure of representations, biological
and developmental plausibility, actual availability for bee organisms and much else.
Note however that the postulation of representational schemes of this sort is not an
ad hoc explanation. A representational system R would be empirically grounded and
made precise in the light of the bee’s testable signaling practices.10 Its postulation
need not be supported by prior, uncritically assumed behavioral capacities free from
empirical commitments.
The explanatory import of representational systems seems to generalize wildly. It is
plausible that such systems provide an account of behavioral systematicity across many
different cognitive domains and across many different kinds of organism. The relevant
question in this context is of a familiar form: what, if not representational theories,
would account for systematicity? The suggestion is that representational theories of
cognition (whatever exactly their specific nature) are actually our best estimates of sys-
tematic behaviors. To all appearances then, the only way anti-representational dynam-
icism can account for systematicity is by appealing (however tacitly) to some such the-
ory. There is of course nothing theoretically objectionable about this. There is a price
to pay nonetheless. The price is that dynamicism is no longer anti-representational
and becomes an implementation of representational theories. This is known territory,
it is just the old systematicity challenge reformulated against anti-representational
dynamicism.
4 Conclusion: a renewed systematicity challenge
This is the argument so far. Once equipped with neutral notions of representation and
behavioral systematicity, we can analyze a substantial case of systematicity in nature,
namely, honey bee communicating behavior. Unlike perhaps honey bee flying behav-
ior, honey bee communicating behavior is blatantly behavior that arises from the same
behavioral capacities. Dynamic fields cannot account for this fact because dynamic
fields would include all sorts of behaviors and would offer no way of distinguishing,
from among those behaviors, the ones that are exercises of the same behavioral capac-
ities and the ones that are not. Things change dramatically, however, if we appeal to
an appropriate scheme of representations. The moral is simple, as it is familiar. Anti-
representational dynamicism has one of two options: either dismiss systematicity in
any neutrally described terms (that is, dismiss systematicity tout court), or else be
conceived as an implementation of representational systems. This would seem fatal
10 Indeed the exact nature of honey bee representational system for communication and navigation is an
empirically open question at least since Von Frisch (1967). Recent data using harmonic radar tracking
strongly suggest that bee waggle dance spatial representation may not only involve estimates of direction
and distance but complex sorts of navigational and motivational information stored in a map-like memory
(see Menzel et al. 2006; Menzel 2011).
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for anti-representational dynamicism, considered as an alternative and general theory
of high cognition. We should try to do better, if we can.
The foregoing argument would perhaps not persuade anti-representationalists of
the failure of their anti-representationalism. Even so, it is clear that the promise of
anti-representational dynamicism for a radically new kind of explanation in the sys-
tematicity debate is simply ungrounded. In this context, anti-representational dynam-
icism might at best lead us to a slightly modified version of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s
well-known systematicity challenge.
The here defended line of reasoning also provides support for a more general
and far-reaching conclusion regarding the benefits of collaborative research which
may be succinctly expressed in terms of levels of explanation. Marr (1982) famously
delineated a three-level distinction as regards explanation in cognitive research (i.e.,
the distinction of the computational, the algorithmic and the implementation levels).
Even if Marr’s own developments may be polemical in several ways, the existence of
different levels of explanation is perhaps the only unchallenged idea of old computa-
tional research (see Verdejo and Quesada 2011 for discussion). However, the dynami-
cist’s anti-representational turn actually involves an unjustified underestimation of the
importance of the different levels, and especially in this context, of the algorithmic,
representational level. The claim that there are no representations or that we should dis-
pense with representations is, nonetheless, a substantial and extreme claim concerning
Marr’s algorithmic level 2: it amounts, in fact, to a radical dismissal of research at that
level as a genuine source for scientific progress. By contrast, it would seem that we can
accommodate everything that dynamicism has on offer within an overall framework
for representational computationalism, writ large, in which explanatory (Marrian)
levels are better demarcated and integrated. This would probably require the task of
investigating, for each particular dynamical model on offer, at which level or levels it
operates.11
This does not mean that dynamical approaches would be secondary in this scenario.
Here, as always, it is useful to keep in mind Marr’s own dictum: levels of explana-
tion must be differentiated but all these levels are levels “at which an information-
processing device must be understood before one can be said to have understood
it completely” (Marr 1982, p. 24). Since information-processing devices can also
be taken to include dynamical information-processing devices, nothing at first sight
seems to tell against the idea of a dynamical account of systematicity that is part of an
integrated account at various levels of explanation, including, notably, the representa-
tional or algorithmic level.12 This strategy for a unified cognitive science would put
us far from the pose-challenge/respond-to-challenge dialectics and is, plausibly, the
11 The lack of consensus amongst scholars on the proper location of dynamical explanations at a particular
level suggests that this task is largely overdue. Horgan and Tienson (1994), for instance, ironically locate
dynamical models at the algorithmic level as proposing a change from the discrete mathematics of classicism
to the continuous mathematics of dynamical systems. The more recent dynamicist focus on embodiment
(Calvo Garzón 2008; Chemero 2009) would suggest that they are located mostly at Marr’s implementation
level 3.
12 This proposal is of course not new. Many authors have shown sympathy to a collaborative view of the
different schools in the cognitive sciences (e.g. Clark 1997; Bechtel 1998; Grush 2003; Beer 2014; Zednik
2011; Fresco 2012; Dawson 2013).
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most promising framework for reaching a powerful and rich account of systematicity
phenomena.
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